Scheduling a bullpen game in the World Series is, to some extent, outside Dave Roberts’ control. More than half of his useful starting pitchers are on the IL, so he has to do something. Game 4 isn’t the perfect spot for Johnny Wholestaff — the way MLB’s playoff format works, it’s the only game of the series that isn’t adjacent to an off day — but it’s also the only spot in a four-man rotation that’s guaranteed to only come up once.
The Dodgers’ manager was fortunate, however, in that by the time Game 4 rolled around, his team was already up 3-0 in the series. No team has ever overturned such a deficit in World Series play, and only once in baseball history has a team come back from 3-0 in any best-of-seven series. This we all knew going in. I was mildly surprised to learn that history is even less kind to clubs that spot their opponents the first three games of a Fall Classic: Before this season, teams with the opportunity to sweep a World Series had won Game 4 21 times in 24 attempts.
So Roberts entrusted Game 4 not just to his bullpen, but to his low-leverage guys: Ben Casparius, Daniel Hudson, Landon Knack, and Brent Honeywell. Sure enough, his team lost.
I’m about to second-guess Roberts here, so I want to say two things up front. First, I think it’s worth pointing out that as much as he gets nitpicked for his postseason tactical acumen — an occupational hazard of managing in October as much as Roberts has — I think Doc’s had a great postseason. He’s been the superior button-presser in both of the past two rounds.
Second, insofar as he made a mistake in Game 4, it is almost certainly not going to come back to bite him. I make predictions, but not guarantees; I’ve seen enough baseball by now to know better. The Dodgers are not certain to take home the big hunk of metal at some point between now and Saturday, but it would take an astonishing historical aberration to prevent them from doing so. The point is, Roberts could’ve started a position player on the mound in Game 4 and the Dodgers would’ve remained overwhelming favorites in this series.
Nevertheless, let’s play along with Roberts’ pitcher usage.
Casparius was the obvious correct choice to start the game as the best of the three options — along with Knack and Honeywell — who could give Roberts length. And there’s a not-particularly-outlandish universe in which Casparius legitimately outpitches Yankees starter Luis Gil. An ice-cold lineup against an unfamiliar rookie with a sharp breaking ball? Stranger things happen every day.
Unfortunately, Casparius was quite bad. In two innings, he walked three, got only two swings and misses, and allowed four batted balls at 95 mph or more. The Connecticut native was lucky to only to allow a single run. Luckier still that two other guys from the Nutmeg State had an even more embarrassing night. (C.S. Lewis believed that Hell was a state of apartness from God, but if they’d had Zyn and DraftKings at Oxford in the 1930s, he would’ve written about these guys instead.)
But after all that, Casparius left the game with the lead, because Freddie Freeman’s been eating his Wheaties.
There’s a time and place to try for the coup de grâce in a game you don’t expect to win. But a bullpen move up 2-1 in the third inning isn’t it. Hudson hasn’t pitched in high leverage this postseason, but he had been effective, allowing a single run in five appearances. Roberts would’ve needed an inning or two from him in order to get far enough into the game to justify using his best relievers. Anthony Volpe’s grand slam was not what the Dodgers had in mind. As badly as Hudson struggled early in the inning, Roberts could’ve warmed up reinforcements in an attempt to preserve his narrow lead before Volpe homered it away. Still, it’s early in the game to throw away the existing strategy of preserving the top arms for Game 5. Roberts could’ve been more aggressive here, but the damage was done quickly.
At that point, the Dodgers were down multiple runs with six innings to go. Broadly speaking, I think it’s a bad idea to use your high-leverage relievers in that situation, especially when the game in question isn’t a must-win. To the extent that the managers made the difference in the NLCS, Roberts’ refusal to do precisely this gave him a huge edge over Carlos Mendoza.
But Knack, who replaced Hudson in the fourth and was supposed to be a white flag, kept the Dodgers in it. I’ve long been fascinated by the mop-up guy who soaks up innings to save his teammates in a playoff loss. Like a scapegoat, in the original meaning of the word. Knack was the 33rd reliever in the Wild Card era to pitch four or more innings in a postseason loss without being charged with the loss himself. Three of those instances came from Roberts’ Dodgers teams, and they represent the spectrum of outings that show up on this list.
One is exemplified by Clayton Kershaw’s four scoreless innings of relief in Game 7 of the 2017 World Series. It’s an elimination game, we’re already losing, so screw it, let’s just bring in our ace on short rest to keep it close. The other came last week, when Honeywell entered Game 5 of the NLCS with Jack Flaherty having gotten lit up and the Dodgers already down six runs in the fourth. Honeywell didn’t keep it close, but he got Roberts within one out of the end of the tunnel. The Dodgers, with a fully rested bullpen, won the series on their next attempt.
Knack was supposed to throw a Honeywell-style bulk relief stint, but he held the Yankees to a single run over four innings. Meanwhile the Dodgers scratched across two runs against Gil, and forced Yankee manager Aaron Boone to break into his high-leverage arms as early as the fifth inning.
By the time Knack came out of the game, it was the bottom of the eighth. The Dodgers were only down two runs, and Luke Weaver — already four outs and 21 pitches into his stint — was about to attempt the longest World Series save by a Yankees pitcher since 1961.
At this point, the Dodgers were no longer in a bullpen game. They were within two runs — a bloop and a blast — of sending the World Series clincher into extra innings against a tiring reliever. The Dodgers, against all odds, were very much in a game they’d seemed resigned to lose.
They were still overwhelming underdogs in that situation; even after Anthony Rizzo grounded out to start the bottom of the eighth, the leverage index was just 0.23 and the Yankees’ win probability was 93.5%. A one-in-15 chance of winning the World Series probably isn’t worth burning Michael Kopech or Blake Treinen. But it’s probably worth dusting off someone like Ryan Brasier, just to see what happens if he puts up a zero.
To that point, Boone had already called on his best relievers, two of them for multi-inning stints. Roberts had used three pitchers who, in a potential Game 7, would have been less involved than some jamoke with season tickets near the right field foul line. And the Dodgers were still in it.
Don’t look a gift horse in the mouth, some might say. I say it’s important to recognize a gift horse when it trots up to you with a ribbon around its neck and asks for a carrot. Roberts stuck to his plan, and when asked about it postgame, said that down 6-4 in the eighth was not the time to deviate.
So in came Honeywell, and within five batters the Yankees led 10-4. By the time Honeywell had completed his excruciating 50-pitch inning, the Dodgers’ chances of winning the game had dropped from one-in-15 to one-in-1,000.
It probably won’t matter. With a rested bullpen and three opportunities to close things out, the Dodgers ought to finish the Yankees off sooner or later. But why put off to tomorrow what you could’ve done today?
