I’m trying out a new format for our managerial report cards this postseason. In the past, I went through every game from every manager, whether they played 22 games en route to winning the World Series or got swept out of the Wild Card round. To be honest, I hated writing those brief blurbs. No one is all that interested in the manager who ran out the same lineup twice, or saw his starters get trounced and used his best relievers anyway because the series is so short. This year, I’m sticking to the highlights, and grading only the managers who survived until at least their League Championship series. Today, let’s talk about the first of that quartet to be eliminated: Stephen Vogt of the Cleveland Guardians.
My goal is to evaluate each manager in terms of process, not results. If you bring in your best pitcher to face their best hitter in a huge spot, that’s a good decision regardless of the outcome. Try a triple steal with the bases loaded only to have the other team make four throwing errors to score three runs? I’m probably going to call that a blunder even though it worked out. Managers do plenty of other things — getting team buy-in for new strategies or unconventional bullpen usage behind closed doors is a skill I find particularly valuable — but as I have no insight into how that’s accomplished or how each manager differs, I can’t exactly assign grades for it.
I’m also purposefully avoiding vague qualitative concerns like “trusting your veterans because they’ve been there before.” Playoff coverage lovingly focuses on clutch plays by proven performers, but David Fry and Kerry Carpenter were also great this October. Forget trusting your veterans; the playoffs are about trusting your best players. Juan Soto is important because he’s great, not because of the number of playoff series he’s appeared in. There’s nothing inherently good about having been around a long time; when I’m evaluating decisions, “but he’s a veteran” just doesn’t enter my thought process. Let’s get to it.
Batting: C-
The Guardians started the postseason with a lineup challenge against the Detroit Tigers: a lefty opener with a righty follower. I liked Vogt’s decision to park Fry, who absolutely crushes lefties, at the top of the lineup. The Guardians greeted Tyler Holton rudely in Game 1 of the ALDS; he faced four batters, and they all scored. Vogt didn’t have many more decisions to make in this one; he did pinch-hit for Fry late with lefty Kyle Manzardo, but I think that was just in service of getting Manzardo his first postseason at-bat in a reasonable situation.
Facing Tarik Skubal the next day, Vogt went full platoon. Fry and Jhonkensy Noel both started, as did Austin Hedges (more on him later). That left Manzardo and Will Brennan on pinch-hitting duty; when Will Vest replaced Skubal in the eighth, he faced two pinch-hitters in three batters. Fry did take a platoon-disadvantaged at-bat against Beau Brieske in the ninth, but Fry’s a good hitter, and it’s not like you can make the whole roster out of the platoon advantage.
One thing I liked about Vogt’s style? He wasn’t afraid to start someone and then pull them early if the situation dictated it. Manzardo drew a start against a righty opener in Game 3, but when lefty Brant Hurter checked in, Vogt pulled Manzardo for Fry. Noel pinch-hit for Brennan before Brennan had even batted! I did think it was questionable to start Brennan and bat him seventh – openers don’t usually go seven batters, and Hurter was the likely follower all along – so I give Vogt only half marks, but at least he was willing to make a quick change if necessary. Noel got two cracks at Hurter as a result.
All this emphasis on lefty-righty matchups made Game 4 strange. Vogt started with his usual lineup against a righty starter, with Manzardo and Brennan in the platoon slots. He then stuck with both of them even when a lefty reliever came in. That let the Tigers cruise with their first lefty reliever, then bring in a second lefty, Sean Guenther, for the bottom of the lineup. Vogt countered by having Noel bat for Bo Naylor again. Then he pinch-hit for Manzardo with Fry – but it was Guenther’s fourth batter, so the Tigers brought in Brieske, a righty, to regain the platoon edge. It didn’t matter, because Fry cracked a two-run homer – he’s a great hitter, period. But given how aggressively Vogt was chasing platoon matchups, it was strange to see Fry bat exclusively against righties and Manzardo face a tough lefty.
After a textbook Game 5 – righties against Skubal – we get to the really interesting stuff. In Game 1 of the ALCS, the Yankees had a lefty on the mound in Carlos Rodón, so Vogt started with the normal platoon setup and left Naylor in at catcher. When righty relievers inevitably entered, the lefty bats started pouring off the bench. Manzardo pinch hit for Noel – a strange decision given that Brennan was also available and can play Noel’s position in the field. Brennan ended up pinch-hitting for Fry and playing DH – doing it the other way would have let the Guardians keep their two preferred lefty bats in the lineup. As it was, Manzardo pinch-hit and then was relieved by Daniel Schneemann.
We need to talk about the Austin Hedges thing, though. Hedges batted five times in the divisional round, which is about five more times than I’d want him to bat. Lest you think that’s harsh, he hit .152/.203/.220 this year, his sixth straight year below the Mendoza line, his fifth straight with an OBP below .250, and his third straight with a slugging percentage below .250. He’s a career 50 wRC+ hitter, and he’s on the decline at 31. I know he’s a great defensive presence, but if Hedges is batting for you, something has gone wrong.
Naturally, Hedges pinch-hit for Naylor in Game 1. Then he stayed in the game – the Guardians didn’t carry a third catcher, so he had to – and made the last out of a 5-2 loss, with the tying run in the on-deck circle. Then in Game 2, Vogt put Fry in for an early high-leverage spot against Gerrit Cole. Great decision – only Naylor was due up, which meant Hedges had to catch the last six innings of the game. He struck out with the bases loaded in his first at-bat, in a spot where the Guardians desperately could have used a better hitter.
Then Hedges just straight up drew the start in Game 3, and against the righty Clarke Schmidt no less. He had the best game of his playoff life – 1-for-2 with a double and a walk – before getting subbed out in a high-leverage spot. I suppose I like this more than the previous plan of having Hedges come in for the high-leverage moments, but I still don’t like it very much overall. In Game 4, things finally came to a head. Vogt started Hedges again, and Hedges even drew a walk against the wild Luis Gil. But in his second at-bat, he inexplicably laid down one of the worst bunts I’ve ever seen:
It was like a spell had been broken. Vogt pinch-hit for Hedges the next time he was due up, and he didn’t see the field again that series. I understand that Naylor was slumping coming into the playoffs. I understand that Vogt loves savvy veteran catchers who know just what to call in every situation. But this was egregious. Hedges can’t hit. He hit .083/.214/.167 in the playoffs, a 17 wRC+. He struck out more than a third of the time.
It’s not like Naylor is a slouch defensively, either; he’s an excellent receiver and capable blocker. His biggest relative weakness is controlling the running game, but the Tigers and the Yankees don’t really run. Even mired in the worst slump of his life, Naylor posted a better line than Hedges, and that’s even without the free walks that you get when Gil rips a few to the backstop. Absolutely no one expected Hedges to hit well. Even he didn’t — did you see that bunt? But Vogt somehow gave him 14 plate appearances, nearly as many as Naylor and by far the most of any backup catcher this postseason. Ew. Perhaps I’m harping on this too much because the rest of Vogt’s decisions were mostly cookie cutter in the Yankees series. But really, Austin Hedges? In this economy!?
There was one other switch worth noting in the series. Schneemann took Brennan’s spot as the preferred lefty outfielder halfway through the ALCS – fine with me, as Brennan wasn’t hitting and they’re similar players overall. In Game 4, though, Brennan subbed in for Schneemann against Jake Cousins; there’s obviously no platoon value here since both hitters were lefties. I think I like this move. Schneemann was absolutely miserable against righty sliders this year, and he’s just not a good breaking ball hitter overall. Cousins throws his slider two-thirds of the time against lefties. It feels like a good matchup to switch out of, so I give Vogt credit here.
Then things got weird. That same spot in the lineup came up again with Mark Leiter Jr. on the mound. Leiter has meaningful reverse splits over a meaningful sample; even if I regress his numbers towards the mean based on how many batters he’s faced, we’re talking about a 6% edge against opposite-handed hitters. Vogt took those splits into account and used Noel to pinch hit for Brennan. I’m not sure I would have made the switch – Brennan hits offspeed stuff fairly well and Leiter wasn’t likely to play bully ball with his fastball – but I at least understand the reasoning here. A very strange pinch-hitting sequence, to be sure, but far more understandable than the Hedges playing time fiasco.
Overall, I like what Vogt was doing aside from the huge blind spot when it came to Hedges. It doesn’t feel great using Fry and Manzardo as platoon DHs, but Fry has an elbow injury that prevents him from playing anywhere other than first base, Manzardo is first-base only, and Josh Naylor is a lineup mainstay, so there just weren’t any good options. I’m a fan of the aggressive platoon switches in high-leverage spots. I’m a fan of Vogt looking beyond the basics when it’s appropriate. Just, fewer veteran savvy backup catchers, please. That decision gets an F; remove that, and we’d be talking about a B+/A- grade.
Pitching: D
Vogt had a plan when it came to his pitching: Get Cade Smith in there first, and figure out what happens next later. In the top of the fifth inning of Cleveland’s first game against Detroit, Carpenter was about to face staff ace Tanner Bibee for the third time, with a runner on first. Not so fast, my friend: Smith parachuted in for a strikeout. This seemed wild to me – the Guardians were up 5-0 and Bibee routinely faced lineups a third time through in the regular season. Vogt put the pedal to the floor anyway, using his four top arms in relief of his ace in a blowout.
The thinking here was undoubtedly that thanks to the staggered TV scheduling, there was an off day before Game 2. But why in the world was Emmanuel Clase giving the heart of the Detroit order a preview of future high-leverage moments in a 7-0 game? I just don’t get it; Cleveland had plenty of low-leverage options, and if ever there was game that called for them, it was this one. The Guardians scored five runs in the first! The Tigers never sent the tying run to the plate. Cleveland’s best starter was on the mound, and he struck out six of the 19 batters he faced. Live a little, Stephen.
In Game 2, Matthew Boyd faced exactly 19 batters. Not 18 – Justyn-Henry Malloy was leading off, and the Tigers were itching to replace him with Kerry Carpenter at the first opportunity. I thought Vogt was clever to avoid giving the Tigers a reason to swap out their platoon hitter. As soon as Malloy’s at-bat was over, Vogt was on the mound to bring in Smith, who faced the middle of the order for a second straight game and simply overmatched them.
That’s when you want Smith: high-leverage spots. Vogt ran back the same playbook behind Smith – Tim Herrin for a pocket of lefties, Hunter Gaddis after that, and then Clase for the remainder of the game at the first moment there was trouble. Clase blew up – he gave up four straight hits including Carpenter’s three-run homer with two outs in the ninth. Good process, bad outcome — hey, it happens.
After another day off, Vogt showed off how he managed from behind. Alex Cobb gave up a pair of early runs, and the Guardians offense never scored. Clase got the day off, as you’d expect, and three different relievers got their first action of the playoffs. You can toss Eli Morgan in with them, too; he only appeared to mop up the last out of the previous game, but he got an inning here. Or, well, most of an inning. With a runner on second and two outs, Vogt brought in Smith to face Jake Rogers. I really didn’t like that one — give the guy a day off!
True to expectations, Smith came in early and worked a long shift in Game 4, again in relief of Bibee. This time, Bibee didn’t look sharp; he notched half as many strikeouts and twice as many walks as in his last outing, and he gave up a home run to boot. That home run was a solo shot to Zach McKinstry, the number seven hitter, and Vogt had seen enough. Smith got the next six batters, and they’d seen quite a bit of him by this point: Matt Vierling and Riley Greene were facing him for a third time, Carpenter got his second look, and whether coincidence or not, two of those three reached base.
Gaddis came in to clean up the mess and gave up a hard-luck bloop single to Wenceel Pérez that put the Tigers out in front. But this was a win-or-go-home game, so Vogt stuck with the plan, following Gaddis with Herrin and then Clase. Clase locked down a five-out save. I’m into it; you can manage workload all you want, but they had to win this one. With a narrow lead, you better use the best closer in the game if you have him.
In Game 5, Vogt really pulled out all the stops. Boyd looked spectacular, striking out five of the first nine batters he faced. They were also the only batters he faced; this was a pre-planned spot for Smith to come in. Smith faced that same stretch of the lineup again – four times in five games! – and won this time, striking out half of the batters he faced over 1 2/3 clean innings. This was an absolutely massive workload – four multi-inning relief appearances in five games, and he even appeared in the fifth game.
Weirdly, Vogt’s short-start gambit included an inning for long reliever Andrew Walters, who surrendered the first run of the game before giving way to Herrin. Herrin also appeared in every game of this series, though in shorter bursts. He didn’t have his best stuff in this one, and the Tigers got him for a run. But the Cleveland offense had finally broken through against Skubal in the previous half-inning, so the run Herrin surrendered only made it 5-2. Vogt continued on as planned, give or take a bad Gaddis outing that necessitated an assist from Morgan to make the math work.
What math? The 21 outs Vogt needed to assemble before he brought in Clase, who came into the game with a runner on and no outs in the eighth inning and closed things out in uneventful fashion. Again, I like the decisiveness here: Vogt was going to win or lose with his best relievers in a win-or-go-home game. I just don’t love how hard he worked them in some of the earlier games, and if you’re only going to use Boyd for nine batters, maybe you should look into some kind of opener situation to get a few more low-leverage plate appearances out of him.
The Cleveland bullpen was running on fumes, but “luckily,” a quick implosion by Cobb in Game 1 of the ALCS meant Smith and Herrin finally got days off. Pedro Avila, who was on the roster specifically because the bullpen needed more arms, mopped up the middle innings – 2 2/3 of them, to be precise. Walters, Erik Sabrowski, and Joey Cantillo filled in the rest. Not a bad outcome, really. The dregs of the bullpen held the Yankees to two runs over 6.1 innings. The Guardians just couldn’t score to get back into it.
Game 2 was another Bibee start, and Vogt wasn’t goofing around. He brought Smith in to face Aaron Judge in the second inning after a reasonable intentional walk. Smith recorded five outs before handing off to Herrin. Herrin did his job, but Bibee’s early exit meant the Guardians still had five innings to cover. The low-leverage guys had to come in and keep things close. Morgan, Sabrowski, and Avila combined for two innings and one run. Then Gaddis came in and got Judged harshly – by a 414-foot homer to make it 6-2 – and that was that. Ben Lively came in to finish the game.
Game 3 felt like a must-win to me, and Vogt clearly thought the same. He had a clear plan: Boyd two times through, then the fearsome foursome of relief arms after that. Boyd delivered, giving up a run but mostly holding the Yankees in check. When Soto came up for a third time, he drew Smith for the first time this series. Smith’s stuff was down across the board – less velo, less spin, and even some sketchy locations – but he still set down Soto, Judge, and Giancarlo Stanton consecutively.
That brought up Herrin. He, too, didn’t have his best stuff but escaped without incident. Then Vogt made a decision I absolutely hated: He stuck with his normal order of operations and brought in Gaddis to face the no. 9-1-2 section of the Yankees lineup in the eighth. What are we doing here? I want Clase facing Gleyber Torres and Soto, not the swingman with a career 4.39 FIP who only broke out this year. Soto walked – which, eh, could happen to anyone – and then Vogt went to Clase because there’s no way Hunter Freaking Gaddis is facing Aaron Judge with a runner on base in a two-run game. Now, did Clase give up a game-tying homer to Judge and then a tie-breaking solo shot to Stanton on consecutive at-bats? He sure did. But he was obviously the right pitcher for the job. He just didn’t have it.
That meant the bottom of the bullpen had to hold things down, and they did. Morgan and Walters tag-teamed the ninth. Morgan allowed an unearned run after the defense botched a rundown, but that was all the Yankees got. The Guardians tied things up in the bottom of the inning thanks to a Noel homer, which set up a matchup of lower-leverage relievers in high-leverage spots, with both teams having burned their top guys. Avila came on to settle in for the long haul of extra innings. I’m a fan of this usage, and it worked as well as you can imagine. Avila pitched a scoreless 10th, and Fry walked it off in the bottom of the frame.
Vogt had worked his bullpen hard in Game 3, and pretty much on purpose. He clearly set the game up to flow through that top quartet. For Game 4, he started Gavin Williams, and it was a near-instant bullpen game again. This time, Vogt branched out. Instead of having Smith take the first crack at Soto and Judge, he went with Sabrowski, who looked incredible en route to three strikeouts out of the six batters he faced. Morgan came in for the bottom of the lineup, and then you guessed it: It was Smith time.
Smith was gassed. His stuff was down, and he was facing the scary center of the Yankees lineup for the third time in three games. He walked Soto. Judge rifled a single. Jazz Chisholm Jr. shockingly bunted – hey, free out, you take those – and then Stanton smashed a three-run homer to break the game open. You can hardly blame Smith for this one. Vogt just kept throwing him at the same collection of fearsome hitters over and over again, on no rest, and Smith finally blinked.
Vogt still managed aggressively, because the Guardians couldn’t really afford a loss. Herrin came in for his customary diet of lefties. Cantillo pitched an inning, and then Gaddis got his own turn at Judge and company. He won this time, with three straight strikeouts, and the Guardians tied the game thanks to some shoddy bullpen work on New York’s part – they, too, had been working their relievers hard and paying a price for it.
Clase came in for the ninth inning, an easy call. He even got to face the easy part of New York’s lineup, starting with the no. 6 hitter. But three singles, all on notably slow cutters that Clase left over the middle of the plate, gave the Yankees a two-run edge that they didn’t relinquish. I don’t think Vogt did anything wrong in this particular instance – sometimes, you just get beat.
The next game was an elimination contest, and the bullpen was shot. Smith was up to eight appearances in nine games. So was Herrin. Clase had gotten shelled two nights in a row. But what are you gonna do, not use them? Bibee came out strong and took a 2-0 lead into the sixth. Vogt had used his bullpen so aggressively and frequently that he really had no choice but to let Bibee face the big boppers a third time. And then… Torres singled, Soto singled, Judge hit into a double play, and Stanton launched a game-tying homer. There wasn’t much of a decision here for Vogt. He was always going to have to give Bibee a longer leash at some point. It’s just a shame that he did it in a tight game instead of a blowout.
Smith still came in, naturally. He was completely gassed. His fastball had no velo and no life. He still chipped in three batters faced, though, and Herrin also shut the Yankees down. Finally, Clase got the ninth against Judge and Stanton, and this time, he was amped up. His velocity and command recovered. It’s a good reminder that there’s nothing deterministic about using a reliever three times in a row. That took us to the 10th inning, and Gaddis’ inevitable appearance. He gave up a three-run bomb to Soto, the fifth batter he’d faced. I didn’t love leaving Gaddis in there. Soto had the platoon advantage, and he was facing Gaddis for a third time in the series. Judge would have been seeing Gaddis for a third time if Soto reached. Gaddis was pitching in his fourth straight game, and for the third consecutive day. Give someone else a chance there.
My biggest issue with Vogt’s bullpen management is that he leaned on his top four relievers to a ridiculous degree. Herrin and Smith are tied for the most appearances this postseason; Gaddis is one appearance behind them, and Clase is one appearance behind him. Do you think that relievers do worse when they face the same batters repeatedly in a series? Smith and Gaddis faced the scariest part of the Yankees lineup three times. Smith faced Riley Greene four times in five games. Clase saw so much of Matt Vierling that I bet they became pen pals. Herrin was omnipresent.
Do you think that relievers do worse when they aren’t rested? Smith and Herrin appeared in all but one game. Each top reliever pitched on three consecutive days the one time Vogt had that option. Every time that there was a game the day after a top reliever had pitched, they came in. Every. Single. Time. No wonder their stuff all looked worn down. This was the case all year. All four of these guys were in the top 10 for relief appearances. But it caught up with them in the end. Some of this is because Shane Bieber is hurt. Some of this is because Bibee isn’t a true ace. But this was too much. You have to give relievers rest. You can see what happens when you don’t.
